By HB Report Investigations
What we found (a documented timeline)
May–Aug 2024: The Smart Schools push
Enugu publicised its Smart Green Schools plan across all 260 wards, positioning the buildings as tech-enabled hubs.
2 July 2024: Award letter
The Ministry of Works & Infrastructure awarded ₦11,457,930,950.52 to Sujimoto to deliver 22 school buildings in six months from acceptance, to be ready for Sept 2025 resumption after furnishing/equipping by others. The state says it paid ₦5,762,565,475.25 (50%) to accelerate works.
Bond & Banking details
Enugu’s statement alleges Sujimoto tendered a Jaiz Bank “bond” (the state’s phrasing) to secure performance, yet received the ₦5.76bn into Sujimoto’s Zenith Bank account registered with the ministry—which, the state argues, prevented any call on Jaiz when things went wrong. (Key compliance point; see questions below.)
May 8–9, 2025: Joint inspection
The state says a joint EFCC/Ministry inspection across sites found “minimal to no significant work” almost a year after award, and cites quality/integrity issues where activity occurred.
Mid–2025: Retaking the sites
Enugu says it reassigned the locations to new contractors to keep the September schooling target in view.
5 Sept 2025: EFCC action
The EFCC declared Ogundele wanted, listing alleged diversion of funds/money laundering tied to the contract.
5–6 Sept 2025: The viral video & government pushback
Ogundele releases an emotional video insisting he’ll report to EFCC and clear his name, describing the matter as a contract dispute worsened by inflation; media outlets captured the clip and quotes. Enugu, in turn, urges the public to “ignore crocodile tears,” restating its claims and the money trail.
What the Enugu State Government says (key claims)
Payment & performance: 50% mobilization (₦5.76bn) paid; poor or negligible progress across sites; use of inexperienced personnel; ignored calls and missed periodic project briefings.
Bond vs bank account: Jaiz Bank bond showed up in procurement, but funds landed in a Zenith account. State says this frustrated recourse to the bond.
Inspections: EFCC/Ministry checks in May 2025 reportedly found little work; state retook and reassigned the sites.
Law-enforcement step: After failed engagements, the state petitioned the EFCC; public statement doubled-down after Ogundele’s video.
Editor’s note: These are the state’s assertions, not judicial findings.
What Sujimoto/Ogundele says (from the circulating video and coverage)
Denial of criminality: “I’m not a thief, I’m not a fugitive… I’m going to the EFCC to clear my name.”
It’s a contract dispute: Blames inflation and price spikes (e.g., cement) and project complexities for delays; frames the matter as commercial, not criminal.
Contextual claims: Says he made repeated trips to Enugu, and that shifting ambitions and broader project expectations complicated execution. (These are his claims from the clip, now under scrutiny.)
Editor’s note: Ogundele has, at the time of writing, not filed a publicly available, line-item documentary rebuttal addressing the state’s specific bond/banking/contention points (see questions below). Our desk will publish any formal response received.
The unresolved fault lines (what professionals will be looking at)
Procurement compliance (state side)
– Was the 50% mobilization consistent with Enugu’s/state procurement rules for public works?
– Were advance-payment safeguards (e.g., Advance Payment Guarantee) distinct from a Performance Bond? The state uses the generic term “bond” — which instrument, precisely, was accepted?
The bond–bank mismatch (contractor & state)
1. If a Jaiz instrument secured performance/advance, why were project funds received into a Zenith account?
2. What did the contract and Letter of Acceptance stipulate on payment channels and security instruments? Was any assignment/novation of the guarantee executed?
Progress certification & valuations (both sides)
1. What Interim Payment Certificates (IPCs) or site instructions exist?
2. What exactly was measured and certified before/after the ₦5.76bn hit Sujimoto’s account? (The state says “minimal to none” by May 2025.)
Variation & price escalation (contractor)
1. Did Sujimoto seek variations or time extensions formally with backing data (BOQ/market indices)?
2. Were any addenda or re-baselined milestones issued, given Nigeria’s construction inflation? (Ogundele cites inflation but no published paperwork yet.)
Supervision & quality control (state)
Who signed off on site supervision and quality assurance during the first months post-mobilization?
Are there structural reports demonstrating the “substandard work/integrity failures” alleged by the state?
Law-enforcement trail (both sides)
EFCC’s notice is public; has Ogundele reported as pledged, and what documentary defence has been tendered?
Project continuity (state)
With sites reassigned, what are the new delivery timelines and cost-to-complete? Any losses crystallised from starting over?
Key documents both parties should publish now (for transparency)
– The full contract (including General Conditions of Contract, Special Conditions, BOQ, drawings, milestones).
– Award/acceptance letters and any minutes of kick-off/briefings.
– The exact bond/guarantee (type, issuer, amount, wording, expiry, governing law), plus evidence of its acceptance by Enugu.
– Bank advice showing where the ₦5.76bn landed, and the contract clause authorising that route.
IPC(s), site diaries, photographs, inspection reports (including the May 8–9, 2025 joint inspection) and any non-conformance notices.
– Contractor’s formal notices (if any) of force majeure, price variation, extension of time, and the state’s responses.
Our closing questions
For the Enugu State Government
1. Why was 50% paid upfront, and what specific security instrument (APG vs Performance Bond) was in force on the payment date?
2. If the Jaiz instrument was the security, why were payments not linked to that instrument’s enforceability (e.g., through a controlled account)?
3. Can you publish the inspection reports (esp. May 8–9, 2025) and certifier’s valuations to substantiate “minimal to no work”?
4. What are the new timelines/costs after reassigning sites, and what losses (if any) will the state pursue as liquidated damages?
For Sujimoto / Dr. Sijibomi Ogundele
1. Please release the contract, bond, IPCs, and site records backing any work done and any variation/time-extension requests you made.
2. If inflation undermined feasibility, where are the formal notices and counter-proposals? Did the contract contain a price-adjustment clause?
3. Why was the government payment received in a Zenith account if a Jaiz bond secured the deal? Was this contractually permitted?
4. You pledged to report to EFCC — have you done so, and will you file a documented, point-by-point rebuttal addressing Enugu’s claims?
Bottom line
This matter sits at the intersection of procurement governance and contract performance. The state’s account is specific on dates, sums, and banking/bond discrepancies; Ogundele’s video is emotive and frames a commercial dispute aggravated by inflation, but it doesn’t yet answer the bond/account questions in writing. The EFCC’s involvement raises the stakes and shifts the conversation from civil breach to potential criminality; documentary evidence will be decisive.
HB Report note: We draw no conclusions at this time. The matter is under investigation. This article reflects our findings to date from verifiable public records and statements. We will update this investigation as soon as either party publishes the documents listed above or provides further evidence.
Key sources: HB Investigations, State statements & coverage (Premium Times, Punch, Nairametrics), EFCC notice reports (Vanguard, Daily Trust, Premium Times), and Sujimoto’s video responses carried by multiple outlets.
